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This paper combines recent studies  of world oil markets and the nascent literature  on
damage estimates from CO, emissions  to derive cost and benefit curves  for the reduction
of CO, emissions  through cooperative  programs  of oil conservation The analysis  shows
that the desirability  of extending  cooperation  in global eners/ conservation  policies  is
essentially an empirical issue,  rather than a conceptual one.  The current evidence
suggests  that over the next two decades,  the OECD will have  more than sufficient
incentive  to reduce  oil consumption  and the associated  CO, emissions  through  unilateral
actions. During this period, extending  cooperation  to the oil-importing  developing
countries  may be unneccesary  and  undesirable.
1. Introduction
The classic  problem of free-ridership among nations characterizes  efforts to curtail
emissions  of carbon  dioxide  and other potential  greenhouse  gases.  When damages  from
ernissions  are global rather than local, countries  that do not participate  in policies
directed at reducing global climate change  receive the benefits of other countries' actions
without incurring the costs.
Past  research  and game-theoretic  analyses  have  emphasized  the gains  from
eliciting the cooperation of developing countries in an effort to limit  global carbon
dioxide  emissions  (Bohm, 1993;  Brown and Huntingtoq 1994b;  Eyckmans,  Proost  and
Schokkaert,  1993;  Hoel, 1991b  and 1994;  Manne  and Rutherford,1994; and  Welsch,z
1995). Broader participation  reduces  the costs  of achieving  any  given  target of emissions
reductions  among  those  nations  engaged  in the coordinated  policies. In essence,  the cost
curve  for countries  reducing  their emissions  shifts  downward  as  participation  expands  to
more counffies.
Recent  estimates  of possible  climate  change  damages  allow us to examine  the
impact of cooperation  on the optimal stratery  for reducing  CO, emissions.  Because
increased  participation  lowers  the costs  of coordinated  policies  to reduce  emissions,  it is
likely to increase the amount of conservation  that the participants would see as
cost-effective for any given set of estimates  of the benefits of reducing emissions  and
avoiding  environmental  damage. Whether  increased  cooperation  yields  too little or too
great a reduction  in emissions  from a world perspective  depends  critically  upon the level
of damage  estimates,  an empirical  issue  that at the moment  is highly  uncertain.
Reduced  usage  of fossil  fuels,  through  higher-efficiency  equipment  and changing
economic  structures  and lifestyles,  is the principal  vehicle  for CO, emissions  abatement.
Policies  that discourage  the use  of coal,  oil, and to a lesser  extent,  natural gas  contribute
to reduced  emissions  of greenhouse  gases,  and hence  lower potential damages  from
climate change. Abatement policies affecting the oil market are particularly complex to
analyze  because  actions  taken  by one country  or group of countries  are likely to
influence  oil consumption  in other parts of the world through  their effect on the world
oil price.
In this paper,  we evaluate  the extent  to which increasing  cooperation  beyond  the
OECD to limit CO, emissions  through  oil conservation  is desirable  from a world3
perspective.  To accomplish  this task,  we derive  cost  and benefit curves  from recent
studies of world oil markets and the nascent  literature on the damages  arising from
changes  in the world environment.  Our analysis  shows  that the desirability of extending
cooperation  in global energy  conservation  policies  is essentially  an empirical issue,  rather
than a conceptual one.  In addition, the cuffent evidence  suggests  that over the next two
decades,  the OECD has  more than sufficient  incentive  to reduce  oil consumption
through  unilateral actions--even  when  taking a precautionary  approach  to reducing  CO,
emissions.  Should  joint action  with other countries  become  desirable  in the longer term,
an immediate  extension  of cooperation  beyond  the OECD to reduce  world oil
consumption  may be unnecessary  and  undesirable.
2.  Estimating the Cost  of Oil Conservation
Like several previous studies,  we use a welfare-theoretic framework built  on top
of a simulation  model of the world oil market to compute  cost  curves  for oil
conservation under alternative assumptions  about which countries are participating in the
poliry.  The curves indicate how participants' costs  change  as the level of conservation
increases.  The cost  curves  include  the direct resource  costs  associated  with shifting
inputs from other sectors  into energr  conservation  activities,  as  well as  the increased  oil
consumption in non-participating counfiies and the wealth transfers associated  with
changes  in the oil price.
2.1 The  World Oil Market
Our analysis  divides  the world into four regions; the industrialized  OECDcountries;  OPEC members;  other less  developed  countries  (non-OPEC  LDC); and
China,  Eastem Europe and the former Soviet  Union, (C/EE/former  SU).  The
simulation  model is calibrated  to reproduce  the oil price,  production  and consumption
data shown  in Table 1. The data in this table represent  one of many  possible  future oil
market outlooks. It is based  on the mid-price  case  in the U.S. Energy  Information
Administration's  (EIA's)  1993  Intemational Energt Outlnok.'
The projected  oil demand  conditiorn  depend  on a variety of assumptions  about
economic  growth,  prices  of competitrg  fuels,  and the extent  of oil-saving  technological
change  in the absence  of price changes.  The supply  conditions  outside  of OPEC
member countries  incorporate  assumptions  about  the resource  base,  engineering
constraints on developing resources,  and producer-country taxes and policies.  In these
projections,  OPEC members  satisff  the excess  demand,  but adjust  the next period's  price
in response  to market tightness.
Table 1 also summarizes  representative  estimates  of the long-run supply and
demand  responses  to price for the major regional  areas  in the analysis.  They represent
mean estimates  derived  from and Energy  Modeling Forum study  (1991)  comparing  ten
major world oil market models  and are quite similar to those  used  by the EIA in
developing  the projections  shown  in the first column. These  estimates  were used  in
construction  of the simulation  model.'
The responses  for the C/EE/former SU region  are  judgmental. Their production
and consumption decisions  are likely to be influenced greatly by the forces of economic
transition,  resulting  in smaller  responses  to changes  in world oil prices  than found in5
other  regions.  In fact,  if the  supply  and  demand  responses  for the  C/EE/former  SU
were made comparable to responses  for other country groups, the conservation scenarios
considered  here would push  world oil prices  sufficiently  low that we would estimate  these
economies  would import significant quantities of oil.  We consider this result untenable,
and therefore assumed  a smaller  response  to price than for other countries. To the
extent  that these  countries  yield a greater  response  to price,  the estimated  costs  of
achieving  various  world conservation  targets  will be larger  than reported  here.
The response  of oil producers  within OPEC is highly  uncertain. To date,  formal
modeling  of OPEC decisions  has  been  far from reliable. OPEC appears  to operate  like
an imperfect cartel during some  times,  but not at others.' The OPEC countries  appear
to be about as  uncomfortable  with a rapidly increasing  market share  (as accompanied
the relatively  low prices  in the 1960s)  as  they are with a rapidly decreasing  market share
(as occurred  in the aftermath  of the price hikes  of the late 1970s  and early 1980s).  The
analysis  presented here assumes  that OPEC acts to maintain a constant market share.o
22  The Cost  of Conservation
We examine  conservation  policies  by reducing  oil consumption  in participating
countries  below the levels  shown  in Tab1e  1 and allowing  the world oil price to adjust  to
restore  a balance  between  oil supply  and demand  conditions. Analytically,  we used  a tax
to reduce  oil consumption. The tax approach  assumes  that conservation  measures  are
applied across  all end uses.
From these  simulations,  we construct  cost  curves  using  a welfare-theoretic
approach  described  by Brown and  Huntington (1994a)  and Felder and Rutherford6
(1993).' The resulting  cost  curves  take irto  account  the effects  that conservation  in the
participating countries will  have in reducing world oil prices, and therefore in inducing
increased  oil consumption  in non-participating  countries  and  transferring  wealth from oil-
exporting nations to oil-importing nations.  These transfers augment an oil-importing
country's wealth, and operate to offset some of the costs  that an oil-importing  country
incurs  by imposing  conservation  policies.
To maintain the emphasis  on the substantial difference in market response  to the
inclusion  of additional countries,  our analysis  abstracts  from a number  of important
considerations  that would be incorporated  in a more refined analysis.  These  conditions
include:  explicitly accounting for different types of goods (Felder and Rutherford,  1993
and  Pezzey,  1992);  the design  of taxes  and redistributive  mechanisms  (Hoel, 1991b);  the
effect of pre-existing  enerry taxes  and other taxes,  which could  be reduced  to offset  some
of the costs  of a new conservation  policy (Hoel, 1991b),  or which,  if left in place,  would
affect the estimated costs  of imposing a new conservation  policy (Newberry, 1992),  afi
the examination of alternative policies for distributing conservation  goals across  countries
(Whalley and Wigle, 1991;  and Brown and Huntington,  1994b). Similarly,  for some
LDCs removing  subsidies  to the energy  sector  could  reduce  energy  use  and improve
economic  efficiency,  in contrast  to our assumption  that conservation  is achieved  through
taxes  that impose  costs  the economy.  Alternatively,  some  LDCs may have supply-
constrained  energy  consumption,  and the costs  of their conservation  efforts  would be
hisher than we estimate  here.I
3.  Differing Incentives  for Oil Conservation
In figure 1, the cost  cuwe labeled  'WORLD'  shows  how much  each  additional
barrel of world oil conservation  costs  all nations  collectively. The construction  of this
curve  assumes  that conservation  is first adopted  wherever  it is cheapest.  The net
transfers  toward oil-importing nations  that are induced  by lower enerry prices  are simply
matched  by net transfers  away  from oil producers.  Thus,  the curve  incorporates  only the
direct costs,  measured  at the world level,  associated  with shifting  resources  toward
energy-conservation  activities.
The cost  curve  labeled'OECD" shows  how much  each  additional  barrel of world
conservation  costs  the OECD countries  if only they  act to conserve  oil.  As such,  this
curve  is constructed  to reflect the increase  in non-OECD consumption  that will result
from lower world oil prices  induced  by unilateral  OECD action  to conserve  oil.  For
lower levels of conservation,  the curve falls below the world cost curve, reflecting the
positive  effect of  wealth transfers  from the rest  of the world to the OECD that result
from lower oil prices.  At  about five rnillion barrels per day of world oil consewation,
the marginal cost  reaches  zero,  and is positive  thereafter.
Although the OECD cost curve starts below the WORLD  cost curve, it rises more
sharply  with increased  conservation  for two reasons.  The wealth transfer  to the OECD
becomes  smaller as  greater  conservation  reduces  imports. In additio4 the  direct costs
increase more sharply for the OECD curve than for the WORLD  curye because
conservation  projects  can  be selected  from only the OECD rather tlan worldwide. As a
consequence,  for conservation  levels  of about seven  million barrels  per day and higher,8
the OECD cost  curve  lies above  the WORLD cost  curve.
The OECD and WORLD cost  curyes  illustrate  that the oil-importing OECD
countries,  acting  as  a group,  have  an incentive  to select  a level of oil conservation  that is
not optimal from a world perspective.  Whether  unilateral OECD action that is not
matched  by other countries  leads  to too much  or too little emissions  reduction,  however,
cannot  be determined  by the cost  information  alone. This issue  can  be resolved  only by
knowing  where the curve  representing  the estimated  benefits  of (or damages  avoided  by)
conservation  intersects  the two cost  curves.
Many analyses  suggest  a flat marginal  damage  curve. Peck  and Teisberg  (1992)
explain that marginal damage  costs  are essentially  unaffected by the emissions  levels in
any  given decade. This conclusion  rests  on the finding that temperature  change  depends
upon gas  concentratioq  which is not greatly  affected  by the emission  levels  in any given
decade. We adopt this characterization by assuming  horizontal damage  curves that
depict a constant  level of benefits  for any  level of oil conservation.
Figure 2 illustrates the situation for two hypothetical benefit curves--one  at $5 per
barrel and one at $20  per barrel. We estimate  that when the benefits  of oil conservation
are below $12.63  per barrel, the cost  curves  reveal  an incentive  for the OECD to pursue
more oil conservation  than is optimal from a world perspective.  In this range,  OECD's
cost  curve  is to the ilght of the WORLD cost  curve. As a result,  the benefit line
intersects  the OECD curve  further to the right than it intersects  the WORLD curve.
Moreover,  at benefit levels  below $12.63  per barrel,  cooperation  from non-OPEC
LDCs will exacerbate  the discrepancy  between  what is optimal from a world perspective9
and  what participants  would have  the incentive  to choose. Cooperation  between  the
OECD and the non-OPEC  LDCs shifts  the participant's  cost  curve  for world oil
conservation  from the one labeled  -OECD" to the one labeled  "OECD+LDC.ft  At
benefit levels  below $12.63  per barrel,  the equilibrium amount  of oil conservation
selected  by the participating countries will  move further to the right-producing  even
more abatement  of CO, emissions  than  would be optimal from the world's perspective.
When the benefits  are above  $12.63  per barrel,  the cost  curves  reveal  an incentive
for the OECD to pursue  less  oil conservation  than is optimal from a world perspective.
Under these  conditions,  the marginal  benefit line intersects  the OECD's marginal  cost
curve  to the left of its intersection  with the world's marginal  cost  curve. Unilateral
OECD action  would result  in too little oil conservation.  Some  limited cooperation  from
developing  countries  could help ameliorate  this problem  by shifting  the cost  curve
outward, but full  cooperation from all developing countries would shift the curve far to
the right, and the participants would seek more conservation  than would be optimal from
a world perspective  unless  the benefits  of oil conservation  were at least  $31.91  per
barrel.
4.  The Benefrts  of Reducing  CO, Emissions
Damage estimates  for CO, are in their infancy.  Economic evaluations attempt to
monetize both market and nonmarket impacts of greenhouse  gas concentrations, and the
resulting estimates  vary considerably. Key uncertainties include the dynamics of the
carbon  cycle  governing  the effect  of emissiors  on concentrations,  the effect of10
concentrations  on temperature  change,  and the consequences  of temperature  change  on
market and nonmarket damages. Differences in discount rates for evaluating potential
impacts  over horizons  of 100  years  or more account  for a significant  part of the
differences  in damage  estimates.  Finally,  estimates  vary depending  upon the decade  for
which they are computed;  estimated  damages  increase  for later decades.
Table 2 reports  estimates  from several  prominent  studies  providing  monetized
estimates of the marginal damages  arising from CO, emissions  in the decade 2001'2010.
Researchers  usually  report their estimates  in U.S.  dollars  per ton carbon  (tC), as  shown
in the first column. We convert  these  estimates  to U.S.  dollars  per barrel of oil in the
second  column. In oil-equivalent  terms,  the mean  damage  estimates  range  from about
one to three dollars  per barrel across  different  studies. Emphasizing  the dramatic
uncertainty  in these  estimates,  the Fankhauser  study  provides  a range  from less  than $1
per barrel to almost $6.50  per barrel,  depending  upon key  parameter  assumptions.
Excluding the outer uncertainty range in the Intera approach, Hope and Maul
(1996)  provide similar estimates  to the range  shown  by Fankhauser  without specifuing
the decade. Using the PAGE model and the inner uncertainty range of the Intera
approach under similar assumptions,  they find damages  from marginal CO. emissions  to
range  from $12  to $45  tC for the PAGE model and from $3 to $50  tC for the Intera
estimates.  The outer uncertainty  range  of tlte Intera analysis,  which should  be accorded
a very low probability because  it combines  many  events,  each  of which is accorded  only a
5 percent  probability by experts  is $0 to $270  tC.  Hope and Maul suggest  that policy
makers taking seriously the threat of global warming should use a precautionary principleIL
and penalize  sources  of CO, according  to the high estimates  found with the PAGE
model or the inner uncertainty  range  of the Intera estimates,  which would amount to
$5.63  (PAGE) or $6.50  (Intera) per barrel of oil.
Even for those  taking a precautionary  approach  to reducing  CO, emissions,  the
available  damage  estimates  fall well below $15  per barrel of oil.  Combined  with the cost
curves  of oil conservation  presented  above,  these  damage  estimates  suggest  that
unilateral  action by the OECD will  lead to excessive  oil conservatiotl and that adding
the LDCb would exacerbate  the problerr.T  At $0 to $33.75  per barrel, the outer
uncertainty  range  of the Intera approach  emphasizes  the possibility  (but low probability)
of higher damage  estimates,  and thus  indicates  the need  for further study  of the benefits
of reducing  CO, emissions.
5.  Conclusion: The Costs  of Extending  Cooperation
The preliminary evidence suggests  that during the next two decades  OECD action
to conserve  oil to reduce  CO, emissions  is likely to result  in more oi1  conservation  than
is optimal from a world perspective.  For the OECD, cooperative  oil conservation  would
reduce  world oil prices  and  yield wealth  transfers  from oil-exporting  countries  to the oil-
importing countries  that are undertaking  the oil-conservation  policies. These  wealth
transfers are sizable and positive for the OECD nations, which collectively are heavily
dependent  upon oil imports, For relatively  small  oil-conservation  strategies,  as are
suggested  by the nascent  literature on the damages  from CO, emissions,  these  wealth
transfers  will dominate  the direct costs  of conservation  and lead to excessive  conservation12
from a world perspective.  This result  contrasts  sharply  with the standard  perspective  that
unilateral OECD action  is likely to lead to insufficient  oil consewation.
Under these  conditions, extending  cooperation  to the oil-importing developing
countries  wili exacerbate  the problem. Participants'  costs  will be reduced,  leading  to
even  larger discrepancies  between  emissions  levels  chosen  by the self-interested
paxticipants  and those  seen  as optimal from a world perspective.
These seemingly anomalous  results are obtained precisely because  the nations
most likely  to cooperate in conserving  oil are likely to exclude the oil-exporting nations
and thus ignore the costs  that conservation  imposes  on the latter group. From a world
perspective, transfers to energy-importing countries are exactly offset by transfers from
net energy  exporting  countries. From the more limited perspective  of the oil-importing
countries  participating  in a coordinated  policy of enerry conservation  policy,  these  wealth
transfers are not offset, but operate as an incentive to conserve  energy and reduce
emissions.  Because  CO, damages  are current\ unpriced  in the market, these  additional
incentives  to conserve  oil may  be a good  thing. Nonetheless,  the current estimates  of the
costs  of CO, damages  are not sufficiently high to justi$  concern that OECD countries do
not have  sufficient  incentive  to act unilaterally  to reduce  emissions.
These  preliminary conclusions  depend  very critically  upon the size  of estimated
damages  from CO, emissions.  ff future estimates  of damages  should  prove to be higher
by a factor of 5-a possibility  suggested  by the outer uncertainty  range  of the Intera
estimates-the  analysis  could  be reversed.  In such  a case,  our cost  estimates  would
suggest  that OECD countries,  would not have  sufficient  incentives  to conserve  oil and13
eliciting LDC cooperation  could improve  the outcome  from a world perspective.  In this
respect,  one implication of our analysis  is that the desirability  of extending  cooperation
in global eners/ conservation  policies is essentially  an empirical issue, rather than a
conceptual  one.
In addition, our conclusions  pertain only to CO, emissions  with a global impact.
The local and regional  benefits  from reducing  energy  use  (e.g.,  the damages  avoided
from local pollution) may well be more important than the benefits  derived  from global
strategies  to reduce  worldwide  environrnental  threats  (See  Hall 1990  and 1992).
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1.  Sensitivity analysis  using a range of alternative assumptions  about the outlook for
2010  and the responsiveness  of consumption  and  production  to changes  in price yielded
qualitatively  similar results  to those  reported  here.
2.  The estimates  are taken from Huntington (L992,  1993).16
3.  Griffin (1985)  and Dahl and Yiicel (1991)  provide empirical estimates  of OPEC
behavior  that are broadly consistent  with this  view
4,  A sensitivity analysis  using alternative assumptions  that allow modest adjustments
in OPEC's  market share  confirm our general  findings. In the extreme,  OPEC could
maintain a given  price and accept  a substantial  loss  in market share  in the face of
reduced  demand. Under these  conditions,  the OECD would not obtain wealth gains
from lower oil prices  with which to offset  the direct costs  of unilateral oil conservation
policies.
5.  The authors  will provide a mathematical  appendix  upon request.
6.  The cost curve is constructed to reflect the gains in non-participant oil
consumption  that will result  from lower world oil prices  induced  by the cooperative
action to conserve oil.  As such,  it reflects participant costs  of world oil conservation.
7.  Sensitivity  testing,  through  the use  of parameters  to replicate  the behavior  of
several  of the prominent enerry models  that participated  in a recent  Energ5r  Modeling
Forum study  (1991),  yielded  qualitatively  similar results.Table  l:  Basel  ine l,lorl  d 0il  Market  Conditions.  2010
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Mid-Price  Case  from  EIA's  1993  International  Energy  0ut1ook. Price  is
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@Tabl  e 2:  Estimated  Damages
Study
Nordhaus  (  1991a,  b)
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Source: Fankhauser  (  1994)
* Authors'  estimates  based
$8,/tC  equals  $l/Bbl  .
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